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J. P. Moreland March 9, 1948

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    J. P. Moreland's contribution to Philosophy

    J.P. Moreland's contributions to philosophy and his writings.
  • Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars

    Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars
    References the metaphysical problem of individuation and how it requires an answer to two different but related questions: 1) How are we to characterize individuality ontologically? 2) What sort of distinction is there between the individuality and nature of an individual?
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    Moreland, P. J. “Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 79, no. 3, 1998, pp. 251–63, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00061.
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  • Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?

    Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?
    Clarifies a widely accepted form of contemporary naturalism and also argues that supervenient physicalism should not be considered as an option for individuals who have accepted this version of naturalism. Also offers a characterization of a version of contemporary naturalism.
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    Moreland, J. P. “Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?” Metaphilosophy, vol. 29, no. 1-2, 1998, pp. 35–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00079.
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  • Universals

    Universals
    This book focuses on a study in analytic ontology on issues and options at the core of the “problem of universals". The problem of universals is a question from metaphysics. Will the properties an object has in common with other objects be considered to exist beyond those objects? If a property exists separate from objects, what is the nature of that existence? Moreland, J. P. “Universals.” Universals, 2001, pp. viii–viii, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315710792. https://youtu.be/nVQN43QyEsE
  • A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul

    A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul
    Offers a conceptualist argument for substance dualism, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies and clarifies and defend its various premises with a special focus on what he takes to be the most controversial one which is thinking conscious matter is metaphysically possible.
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    MORELAND, J. P. “A Conceptualist Argument for a Spiritual Substantial Soul.” Religious Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, 2013, pp. 35–43, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000133.
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