-
The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957
In The Copernican Revolution, Kuhn claimed he had identified an important feature of the revolution, which previous scholars had missed: its plurality. What Kuhn meant by plurality was that scientists have philosophical and even religious commitments, which are important for the justification of scientific knowledge. This stance was anathema to traditional philosophers of science, who believed that such commitments played a little role in the justification. -
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
In this work Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not evolve gradually towards truth. Science has a paradigm which remains constant before going through a paradigm shift when current theories can't explain some phenomenon, and someone proposes a new theory. The structure of scientific development, according to Kuhn, may be illustrated schematically, as follows: pre-paradigm science, normal science, extraordinary science, new normal science. A scientific revolution occurs with crisis resolution. -
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
Kuhn spoke of the “essential tension” between convergence and divergence, a tension that he took to be a prerequisite of scientific advancement and creativity. He argued that these two conflicting modes of thought ought to characterize both the scientific community and the individual scientists. Convergence builds traditions and divergence, at crucial junctures, draws attention to new possibilities. The individual scientist must be able to act as both “a traditionalist and an iconoclast” -
The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
This book’s aim was certainly to address the philosophical issues left over from Structure, but more importantly, it was to resolve the problems generated by a historical philosophy of science. Although others were also responsible for its creation, Kuhn assumed responsibility for resolving the problems and for resolving them was the incommensurability thesis. For Kuhn, the thesis was required more than ever to defend rationality from the post-modern development of the strong program.